Ambiguity on the insurer's side: the demand for insurance by Amarante, Massimiliano et al.
AMBIGUITY ON THE INSURER’S SIDE:
THE DEMAND FOR INSURANCE
MASSIMILIANO AMARANTE
UNIVERSITE´ DE MONTRE´AL AND CIREQ
MARIO GHOSSOUB
IMPERIAL COLLEGE LONDON
EDMUND PHELPS
CENTER ON CAPITALISM AND SOCIETY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
THIS DRAFT: OCTOBER 21, 2014
Corresponding Author: Mario Ghossoub, m.ghossoub@imperial.ac.uk.
Key Words and Phrases: Optimal Insurance, Deductible, Ambiguity, Choquet Integral, Distorted Proba-
bilities.
JEL Classification: G22.
We thank Enrico Biffis, Daniel Gottlieb, John Quah, and an anonymous referee for their comments and
suggestions. Mario Ghossoub acknowledges financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada.
2Abstract. Empirical evidence suggests that ambiguity is prevalent in insurance pricing
and underwriting, and that often insurers tend to exhibit more ambiguity than the insured
individuals (e.g., [23]). Motivated by these findings, we consider a problem of demand for
insurance indemnity schedules, where the insurer has ambiguous beliefs about the real-
izations of the insurable loss, whereas the insured is an expected-utility maximizer. We
show that if the ambiguous beliefs of the insurer satisfy a property of compatibility with
the non-ambiguous beliefs of the insured, then there exist optimal monotonic indemnity
schedules. By virtue of monotonicity, no ex-post moral hazard issues arise at our solu-
tions (e.g., [25]). In addition, in the case where the insurer is either ambiguity-seeking or
ambiguity-averse, we show that the problem of determining the optimal indemnity sched-
ule reduces to that of solving an auxiliary problem that is simpler than the original one
in that it does not involve ambiguity. Finally, under additional assumptions, we give an
explicit characterization of the optimal indemnity schedule for the insured, and we show
how our results naturally extend the classical result of Arrow [5] on the optimality of the
deductible indemnity schedule.
1. Introduction
The classical formulation of the problem of demand for insurance indemnity schedules
is due to Arrow [5]: a risk-averse Expected-Utility (EU) maximizing individual faces an
insurable random loss X , against which he seeks an insurance coverage; and, a risk-neutral
EU-maximizing insurer is willing to insure this individual against the realizations of the
random loss, in return for an upfront premium payment. The insured seeks an indemnity
schedule that maximizes his expected utility of final wealth, subject to the given premium
Π determined by the insurer. Arrow’s [5] classical theorem states that in this case, the
optimal insurance indemnity schedule takes the form of full insurance above a constant
positive deductible. That is, there exists a constant d ě 0 such that the optimal insurance
indemnity schedule is of the form
Y ˚ “ max
´
0, X ´ d
¯
.
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This is a pure risk-sharing result: both parties have the same probabilistic beliefs, and the
need for insurance is a consequence only of their different attitudes toward risk. Ghossoub
[17] extended Arrow’s result to the case of heterogeneous beliefs. Ghossoub’s [17] result and
a fortiori Arrow’s [5] result apply, however, only to those situations where both parties have
rich information about the relevant uncertainty, so as to be able to reduce that uncertainty
to risk and form a probabilistic assessment. In contrast, empirical evidence suggests that
ambiguity (as opposed to risk) is prevalent in insurance pricing and underwriting, and
that often insurers tend to exhibit more ambiguity than the insured individuals (e.g., [23]).
Motivated by these findings, we re-examine the classical insurance demand problem of
Arrow [5] in a setting where the insurer has ambiguous beliefs (in the sense of Schmeidler
[41]) about the realizations of the insurable loss, whereas the insured is an EU-maximizer.
Formally, we examine a problem similar to that of Arrow [5], with the sole difference
that the beliefs of the insurer are represented by a capacity (Appendix A, Def. A.1) rather
than a probability measure. Our results are as follows. First, we present a general re-
sult (Theorem 4.6), which states that if the parties’ beliefs satisfy a certain compatibility
condition (Def. 4.5), then optimal indemnity schedules exist and are monotonic. Here,
monotonicity means that the optimal indemnity schedule is a nondecreasing function of
the realizations of the insurable loss random variable. As it is well-known, this property
rules out ex post moral hazard issues that could arise from the possibility that the insurer
could misreport the actual amount of loss suffered (Huberman, Mayers and Smith [25]).
This result complements a similar result that we obtained in [3] for a slightly different
setting (which involves some minor technical differences).
We then consider the case where the insurer is either ambiguity-seeking or ambiguity-
averse in the sense of Schmeidler [41]. We show that in both cases, an optimal indemnity
schedule can be replicated by an optimal indemnity obtained from an insurance problem
in which both the insured and the insurer are EU-maximizers, but have different beliefs
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about the realizations of the insurable random loss (Proposition 5.1 and Proposition 6.1).
Such problems have been recently studied by Ghossoub [17].
Finally, under additional assumptions, we obtain an explicit characterization of the op-
timal indemnity schedule as a function of the underlying data. In the case of an ambiguity-
seeking insurer whose capacity is a distortion of the probability measure of the insured, we
show that the optimal indemnity schedule takes the form
Y ˚ “ min
«
X,max
´
0, X ´ d pT q
¯ﬀ
,
where T is the concave probability distortion function of the insurer (see Appendix A),
and d pT q is a state-contingent deductible that depends on the state of the world only
through the function T (Theorem 5.4). In the case of an ambiguity-averse insurer whose
capacity has a core (Appendix A, Def. A.2) consisting of probability measures with the
monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) property, we show that the optimal indemnity schedule
is a state-contingent deductible of the form
Y ˚ “ min
«
X,max
´
0, X ´ d pLRq
¯ﬀ
,
where LR denotes a function of the likelihood ratios of the probabilities in the core of the
supermodular capacity over the probability of the insured (Corollary 6.3). In both cases,
we determine the state-contingent deductible d explicitly. Arrow’s solution obtains as a
limit case from both settings: when the distortion function T becomes the identity function
in the ambiguity-seeking case and when the core collapses to the probability measure of
the insured in the ambiguity-averse case.
Related Literature. The literature on ambiguity in insurance design can be split into two
main streams: (i) ambiguity on only one side of the insurance problem, and (ii) ambiguity
on both sides. In the former category, all of the work that has been done has invariably
assumed that the ambiguity is on the side of the insured. As such, it is very different from
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what we do in this paper. For instance, Alary et al. [1] consider an insured who is ambiguity-
averse in the sense of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji [31], and assume that the ambiguity
is concentrated only in the probability that a loss occurs. Conditional on a loss occurring,
the distribution of the loss severity is unambiguous. Under these assumptions, they show
that the optimal indemnity is a straight deductible. Gollier [20] also focuses on the case of
an insured who is ambiguity-averse in the sense of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji [31].
He shows that if the collection of priors can be ordered according to the MLR property, then
the optimal indemnity schedule contains a disappearing deductible. Jeleva [27] considers an
insurance model in which the insurer is Choquet-Expected Utility (CEU) maximizer [41].
She specifies ex ante that the insurance contract is of the co-insurance type, and she then
examines the optimal co-insurance factor. Young [46] and Bernard et al. [6] examine the
case where the insured is a Rank-Dependent Expected-Utility maximizer [37, 45]. Doherty
and Eeckhoudt [15] study the optimal level of deductible under Yaari’s Dual Theory [45].
Karni [30] and Machina [32] consider a setting where the preferences of the insured have
a non-EU representation that satisfies certain differentiability criteria. The former shows
that a deductible indemnity schedule is optimal; whereas he latter examines the optimal
level of co-insurance and optimal level of deductible. Schlesinger [39] examines the optimal
co-insurance level in a situation where the preferences of the insured are not necessarily
EU preferences, but they are risk-averse in the sense of disliking men-preserving increases
in risk.
In the second stream of the literature on ambiguity in insurance design, which contem-
plates ambiguity on both sides, Carlier et al. [10] consider the case in which both parties’
beliefs are epsilon-contaminations of a given prior, and they show that the optimal indem-
nity contains a deductible for high values of the loss. Anwar and Zheng [4] allow for both
two-sided ambiguity and belief heterogeneity but restrict to a model with only two states
of the world. As such, the scope of their inquiry is limited because, in general, finan-
cial and insurance risks are not binary risks (as they would necessarily be in a two-state
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model). Moreover, the shape of an optimal indemnity schedule cannot be determined in a
two-state model where the loss X can take only two values1: L with probability p, and 0
with probability 1´ p .
More general problems that are directly relevant to the insurance problem considered
here have been examined by Carlier and Dana [7, 8, 9] and Chateauneuf et al. [12]. However,
none of these studies provide a full characterization of the optimal insurance indemnity
schedule, which is one of the main goals of the present paper.
2. Setup
Let S denote the set of states of the world, and suppose that G is a σ-algebra of
subsets of S, called events. Denote by B pGq the linear space of all bounded, R-valued
and G-measurable functions on pS,Gq, and denote by B` pGq the collection of all R`-
valued elements of B pGq. Any f P B pGq is bounded, and we define its supnorm by
}f}sup :“ supt|f psq| : s P Su ă `8.
Suppose that an individual has initial wealth W0 and is facing an insurable random loss
X , against which he seeks insurance. This random loss is a given element of B` pGq with
closed range X pSq “ r0,Ms, where M :“ }X}sup ă `8. Denote by Σ the σ-algebra σtXu
of subsets of S generated by X . Then by Doob’s measurability theorem [2, Theorem 4.41],
for any Y P B pΣq there exists a Borel-measurable map I : R Ñ R such that Y “ I ˝ X .
Denote by B` pΣq the cone of nonnegative elements of B pΣq. Let P be a probability
measure on pS,Σq. We will make the following assumption all throughout.
Assumption 2.1. The random loss X is a continuous random variable2 on the probability
space pS,Σ, P q. That is, the Borel probability measure P ˝X´1 is nonatomic3.
1At least if one imposes, as it is customary, the constraint that the indemnity be non-negative and not
larger than the loss itself.
2This is a standard assumption, and it holds in many instances, such as when it is assumed that a
probability density function for X exists.
3A finite nonnegative measure η on a measurable space pΩ,Aq is said to be nonatomic if for any A P A
with η pAq ą 0, there is some B P A such that B Ĺ A and 0 ă η pBq ă η pAq.
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The insured seeks an insurance coverage against this random loss X . He has access to
an insurance market in which he can purchase an insurance indemnity Y “ I pXq, which
pays the amount I pX psqq ě 0, in the state of the world s P S. By Doob’s measurability
theorem, we can identify B` pΣq with the collection of all possible indemnity schedules.
The price of this insurance indemnity schedule is called the insurance premium, and it is
denoted by Π. The premium is determined by the insurer, based on his beliefs about the
realizations of X (and hence of Y ).
3. Insurance Demand with No Ambiguity: The Classical Case
In the classical insurance model of Arrow [5], both the insurer and the insured have
non-ambiguous beliefs about the realizations of X and share the same probabilistic beliefs.
Both individuals are EU-maximizers. The insurer is risk-neutral, having a linear utility
function4, whereas the insured is risk-averse, having a concave increasing utility function.
Let u denote the utility function of the insured. In each state of the world s P S, the
wealth of the insured is given by W psq “ W0 ´ Π´X psq ` Y psq, where Y “ I ˝X is an
indemnity function. The problem of the insured is that of determining which indemnity
schedule maximizes his expected utility of wealth, for a given premium Π ą 0. Specifically,
the problem of the insured is that of choosing Y in B` pΣq so as to maximizeż
u pW0 ´ Π ´X ` Y q dP,
subject to the classical constraint that the indemnity function is nonnegative and does not
exceed the loss, that is, 0 ď Y ď X , and subject to the participation constraint of the
insurer ż `
W ins
0
` Π´ Y ´ c pY q
˘
dP ěW ins
0
,
where W ins
0
is the initial wealth of the insurer and c pY q “ ρ.Y is a (proportional) cost
function, with ρ ě 0. The participation constraint of the insurer can then be re-written as
4Since utility functions are defined up to a positive linear transformation, it is usually assumed, without
loss of generality, that the linear utility function of the insurer is simply the identity function.
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the following premium constraint :
Π ě p1` ρq
ż
Y dP.
Arrow’s [5] classical result states that in this case, the optimal insurance indemnity
schedule is a deductible insurance schedule:
Theorem 3.1 (Arrow). The optimal indemnity schedule is a deductible contract, with
deductible level d ě 0. That is, the optimal indemnity schedule is
Y ˚ “ max
´
0, X ´ d
¯
.
Moreover, d is such that
ş
Y ˚dP “ Π
1`ρ
.
4. Insurance Demand with Insurer Ambiguity
The assumption that both parties reduce uncertainty to risk severely limits the applica-
bility of results such as Arrow’s. Hogarth and Kunreuther [23] have shown that ambiguity
is prevalent in insurance pricing and underwriting, and that the insurers tend to exhibit
more ambiguity than the insured. Because of this, we are going to modify Arrow’s model
by assuming that the insurer has ambiguous beliefs about the realization of the random
loss X , while we maintain the assumption that the insured is an EU-maximizer. Precisely,
we assume that the insured is a risk-averse EU-maximizer with a concave utility function
u that satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 4.1. The utility function u of the insured satisfies Inada’s [26] conditions5:
5Note the following:
Remark 4.2. The strict concavity and the continuous differentiability of u imply that first derivative
u1 is both continuous and strictly decreasing. The latter implies that pu1q
´1
is continuous and strictly
decreasing, by the Inverse Function Theorem [38, pp. 221-223]. Moreover, the continuity of u implies that
u is bounded on every closed and bounded subset of R.
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(1) u p0q “ 0;
(2) u is strictly increasing and strictly concave;
(3) u is continuously differentiable; and,
(4) The first derivative satisfies u1 p0q “ `8 and lim
xÑ`8
u1 pxq “ 0.
In contrast, the insurer is a CEU-maximizer, as in Schmeidler6 [41]. In this case, for a
given indemnity schedule Y P B` pΣq, the participation constraint of the insurer is given
by ż `
W ins
0
` Π´ p1` ρq Y
˘
dν ě W ins
0
.
By letting R “ Π
1`ρ
ą 0, this can be rewritten (see Proposition A.6) as the following
premium constraint7:
R ě ´
ż
´Y dν ě 0.
Thus the problem of determining the optimal indemnity schedules becomes as follow.
The insured seeks an indemnity schedule that maximizes his expected utility of terminal
wealth, subject to the above premium constraint, and to the classical constraint that the
indemnity is nonnegative and does not exceed the full amount of the loss:
(4.1) sup
Y PBpΣq
#ż
u pW0 ´ Π ´X ` Y q dP
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ 0 ď Y ď X, ´
ż
´Y dν ď R
+
Remark 4.3. For any Y P B pΣq which is feasible for Problem (4.1), one has 0 ď Y ď X .
Therefore, by monotonicity of the Choquet integral (Proposition A.6 (2)), it follows that
0 ď
ż
Y dν ď
ż
X dν and 0 ď ´
ż
´Y dν ď ´
ż
´X dν.
6All necessary background material about capacities and Choquet integration is given in Appendix A.
7Since the Choquet integral is only positively homogeneous (Proposition A.6 (3)), the premium constraint
cannot be written as R ě
ş
Y dν.
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Now, there are two cases: either R ě ´
ş
´Xdν or 0 ă R ă ´
ş
´Xdν. It is easily seen
that when R ě ´
ş
´Xdν, Problem (4.1) is solved at once, and that the solution Y ˚ is
full insurance. Thus, we are going to focus on the remaining case, that is we are going to
assume that
Assumption 4.4. 0 ă R ă ´
ş
´X dν.
In a Bayesian setting (i.e., with no ambiguity) monotonicity properties of optimal solu-
tions are typically obtained by imposing the Monotone Likelihood Ratio (MLR) property
(see Milgrom [34]). Unfortunately, the MLR property cannot be formulated in the case
of capacities because of the lack of density functions. Ghossoub [17], however, has shown
that in a Bayesian setting a property (strictly) weaker than the MLR property suffices.
This has been extended to the case of a capacity in Amarante, Ghossoub, and Phelps [3],
who refer to it as vigilance. This property expresses a form of compatibility between the
probabilistic beliefs of the insured and the non-additive beliefs of the insurer. Here, we use
a slightly different formulation from that of Amarante, Ghossoub and Phelps [3].
Definition 4.5 (Belief Compatiblity). Let ν be a capacity on Σ, let P be a probability
measure on the same σ-algebra and let X be a random variable on pS,Σq. We say that ν
is compatible with P (or P -compatible) if for any Y1,Y2 P B
` pΣq such that
(i) Y1 and Y2 have the same distribution under P ; and
(ii) Y2 and X are comonotonic
8 (Y2 is a nondecreasing function of X),
the following holds
´
ż
´Y2dν ď ´
ż
´Y1dν.
Clearly, any capacity ν “ T ˝ P that is a distortion of the probability measure P (see
Appendix A) is compatible with P . In particular, any probability measure P is clearly
8See Definition A.5.
AMBIGUITY ON THE INSURER’S SIDE: THE DEMAND FOR INSURANCE 11
P -compatible. We refer to Amarante, Ghossoub, and Phelps [3] and to Appendix B for a
list of examples of capacities that are P -compatible.
We can now state our main result. Its proof is given in Appendix D.
Theorem 4.6 (Existence and Monotonicity of Optimal Indemnity Schedules).
If ν is continuous (Definition A.3) and compatible with P , then Problem (4.1) admits
a solution Y ˚ which is comonotonic with X; that is, there exists an optimal indemnity
schedule which is a nondecreasing function of the random loss X. Moreover, any optimal
indemnity schedule is necessarily comonotonic with X, except possibly on a set of probability
zero under P .
Theorem 4.6 is a general result. It says that when the ambiguous beliefs of the insurer are
compatible with the non-ambiguous beliefs of insured in the sense of Definition 4.5, then
the problem of existence of an optimal indemnity schedule always has a solution. Moreover,
any such solution has to be a nondecreasing function of the insurable loss (except maybe
on an event to which the insured assigns zero likelihood), thus ruling any ex-post moral
hazard issues that might occur.
5. Insurance Demand with an Ambiguity-Seeking Insurer
In Theorem 4.6 we do not make any assumption on the insurer’s attitude toward am-
biguity. In this section, we focus on an ambiguity-seeking insurer. We are going to show
that the problem of determining the optimal indemnity schedule reduces to that of solving
an auxiliary problem which is simpler than the original one, in that it does not involve am-
biguity. Furthermore, we are going to explicitly solve for the optimal indemnity schedule
in the case where the beliefs of the insurer are represented by a distortion of a probability
measure. In the next section, we will study the case of an ambiguity-averse insurer.
When the insurer is ambiguity-seeking, his capacity ν is submodular. A classical result
of Schmeidler [40] states that there exists a non-empty, weak˚-compact, and convex set AC
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of probability measures on pS,Σq (called the anticore of ν) such that for all Y P B pΣq,ż
Y dν “ max
QPAC
ż
Y dQ.
Hence, for each Y P B` pΣq,
´
ż
´Y dν “ ´max
QPAC
ż
´Y dQ “ min
QPAC
ż
Y dQ.
Consequently, the premium constraint of the ambiguity-seeking insurer can be written as
R ě min
QPAC
ş
Y dQ, which implies that for a given indemnity schedule Y , R has to be just
enough to cover the lowest possible expectation of Y under the probability measures Q in
the anticore of ν.
In this case, the problem of the insured becomes the following:
(5.1) sup
Y PBpΣq
#ż
u pW0 ´ Π´X ` Y q dP
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ 0 ď Y ď X, minQPAC
ż
Y dQ ď R
+
,
where AC is the anticore of the submodular capacity ν.
We now show that the solution of this problem reduces to the solution of a simpler
problem, one that does not involve ambiguity but only involves heterogeneity of beliefs.
For each Q P AC, consider the problem
(5.2) sup
Y PBpΣq
#ż
u pW0 ´ Π´X ` Y q dP
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ 0 ď Y ď X,
ż
Y dQ ď R
+
,
That is, (5.2) is a problem similar to (5.1) but (ideally) involves an insurer who is an
EU-maximizer, with Q P AC being the probability representing the non-ambiguous beliefs
of the insurer. If Q is compatible with P , then by Theorem 4.6, Problem (5.2) admits a
solution that is comonotonic with X . Let us denote by Y ˚ pQq this optimal solution.
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Proposition 5.1. If the capacity ν is submodular with anticore AC, and if every Q P AC is
compatible with P , then there exists a Q˚ P AC such that Y ˚ pQ˚q is a solution to Problem
(5.1).
The proof of Proposition 5.1 is given in Appendix E. It is important to note that Propo-
sition 5.1 does not say that an ambiguity-seeking insurer with a submodular capacity ν
behaves just like an EU-maximizer with subjective probability measure Q˚: when pre-
sented with an indemnity schedule Y ‰ Y ˚, the insurer will evaluate Y using a probability
measure Q ‰ Q˚. Equivalently, Proposition 5.1 is only a statement that a maximum is
obtained, but this simple observation buys us a lot of mileage. We refer the reader to Ghos-
soub [17] for an extensive inquiry into the properties of solutions to problems of optimal
insurance design with non-ambiguous but heterogeneous beliefs.
The Case of a Probability Distortion. We now find an explicit solution for the optimal
indemnity schedule. We do so under the additional assumption that the capacity of the
insurer is a distortion of the probability measure of the insured, that is ν is of the form
ν “ T ˝ P , for a distortion function that satisfies the following properties.
Assumption 5.2. The distortion function T : r0, 1s Ñ r0, 1s is such that:
‚ T is concave;
‚ T is increasing and twice differentiable; and,
‚ T p0q “ 0 and T p1q “ 1.
We also make the following assumption.
Assumption 5.3. The insured has initial wealth W0 ´ Π such that X ď W0 ´ Π, P -a.s.
That is, P
˜!
s P S : X psq ąW0 ´ Π
)¸
“ 0.
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Assumption 5.3 simply states that the insured is well-diversified so that the particular
exposure to X is sufficiently small, with respect to the total wealth of the insured.
The problem of the insured is the following:
(5.3) sup
Y PBpΣq
#ż
u pW0 ´ Π ´X ` Y q dP
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ 0 ď Y ď X, ´
ż
´Y dT ˝ P ď R
+
,
The following Theorem gives a full characterization of the optimal indemnity schedule
for the insured. Its proof is given in Appendix F.
Theorem 5.4. If assumptions 2.1, 4.1, 4.4, 5.2, and 5.3 hold, then the function Y ˚ defined
by
(5.4) Y ˚ “ min
«
X,max
´
0, X ´ d pT q
¯ﬀ
,
is an optimal solution for Problem (5.3), where
(5.5) d pT q “ W0 ´ Π ´ pu
1q
´1
´
λ˚T 1 pUq
¯
,
U “ FX pXq and λ
˚ ě 0 is such that the second constraint of Problem 5.3 is binding at the
optimum (whenever λ˚ ą 0).
Equations (5.4)-(5.5) are sufficient for an optimal solution. The λ˚ appearing in Theorem
5.4 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the premium constraint (the participation
constraint of the insurer), but in a restated version of Problem 5.3 (all details are in
Appendix F).
Note that in Arrow’s theorem (Theorem 3.1), the optimal indemnity takes the form
Y ˚ “ max p0, X ´ dq, where d ě 0. The positivity of d then implies that the optimal
indemnity can be written as Y ˚ “ min
”
X,max p0, X ´ dq
ı
. Theorem 5.4 asserts that
when the beliefs of the insurer are a concave distortion of the probability measure of the
insured, the optimal indemnity takes a similar form, but in which the deductible is variable.
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As one would expect, the state-contingent deductible d pT q given in equation (5.5) de-
pends also on the initial wealth level of the insured. The higher the initial wealth of the
insured, the higher the deductible level, ceteris paribus. Therefore, the higher initial wealth
of the risk-averse insured, the lower the amount of indemnity that the insured receives
(given by equation (5.4)). In this sense, insurance is an inferior good, which is a well-
known result in the classical theory of insurance. Similar findings in the classical insurance
model with non-ambiguous beliefs are discussed by Moffet [35] and Mossin [36]. Moreover,
the higher the premium paid by the risk-averse insured, the lower the deductible level, and
the higher the amount of indemnification received by the insured. This is intuitive: the
more a risk-averse individual pays for insurance, the higher the insurance coverage that
the individual expects to receive.
Proposition 5.5 below further characterizes the optimal indemnity schedule. Its proof is
given in Appendix G.
Proposition 5.5. If the assumptions of Theorem 5.4 hold, then:
(1) If Y is a solution to Problem (5.3), then Y is comonotonic with X, except possibly
on a set of probability zero under P .
(2) The optimal indemnity schedule Y ˚ given in eq. (5.4)-(5.5) is a nondecreasing func-
tion of the loss random variable X.
(3) If Z˚ is any other indemnity schedule which is a nondecreasing function of X and
is identically distributed as Y ˚, then Z˚ “ Y ˚, P -a.s.
The final part of Proposition 5.5 is noteworthy. We refer to Gollier and Schlesinger
[21] for the importance of characterizing the distribution of an optimal indemnity schedule
rather than its actual shape.
The optimal indemnity schedule given in Theorem 5.4 satisfies another useful property.
Recall that in the classical setting of Arrow, the optimal indemnity schedule is a deductible
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schedule of the form Y “ max pX ´ d, 0q, for some constant d ě 0, the deductible level.
In this case, if s1 and s2 are two states of the world such that X ps1q ą d and X ps2q ď d,
then it follows immediately that X ps1q ą X ps2q. This kind of ordering is preserved in our
more general setting:
Proposition 5.6. Under the assumptions of Theorem 5.4, the optimal indemnity schedule
Y ˚ given in eq. (5.4)-(5.5) satisfies the following property: If s1, s2 P S are such that
d pT q ps1q ă X ps1q and X ps2q ď d pT q ps2q , then it follows that X ps2q ă X ps1q .
The proof of Proposition 5.6 is given in Appendix H. When the insurer does not distort
probabilities, the function T is the identity function, and we recover Arrow’s [5] result:
Corollary 5.7. If the insurer is a risk-neutral EU-maximizer and if the insured is a risk-
averse EU-maximizer such that assumptions 2.1, 4.1, 5.3 and 4.4 hold, then the function
Y ˚ defined by
Y ˚ “ min
«
X,max
´
0, X ´ d
¯ﬀ
“ max
´
0, X ´ d
¯
,
is an optimal indemnity schedule for the insured, where
d “ W0 ´ Π ´ pu
1q
´1
pλ˚q ą 0,
and λ˚ is chosen so that
ş
Y ˚ dP “ R “ Π
1`ρ
.
The λ˚ appearing in Corollary 5.7 is obtained similarly to the one appearing in Theorem
5.4. The proof of Corollary 5.7 is given in Appendix I.
6. Insurance Demand with an Ambiguity-Averse Insurer
This section mirrors the previous one but with an ambiguity-averse insurer replacing
the ambiguity-seeking insurer. We are going to show that the problem of determining the
optimal indemnity schedule reduces, just like before, to that of solving an auxiliary problem
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that does not involve ambiguity. Moreover, we are going to find an explicit solution for
the optimal indemnity schedule by imposing an additional assumption.
Suppose now that the insurer is ambiguity-averse, that is, his capacity ν is supermodular.
By a result of Schmeidler [40], there exists a non-empty, weak˚-compact, and convex set C
of probability measures on pS,Σq (called the core of ν) such that for all Y P B pΣq,ż
Y dν “ min
QPC
ż
Y dQ.
Hence, for each Y P B` pΣq,
´
ż
´Y dν “ ´min
QPC
ż
´Y dQ “ max
QPC
ż
Y dQ.
Consequently, the premium constraint of the ambiguity-averse insurer can be written as
R ě max
QPC
ş
Y dQ, which implies that for a given indemnity schedule Y , R has to be enough
to cover the highest possible expectation of Y under the probability measures Q in the
core of ν.
In this case, the problem of the insured becomes the following:
(6.1) sup
Y PBpΣq
#ż
u pW0 ´ Π´X ` Y q dP
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ 0 ď Y ď X, maxQPC
ż
Y dQ ď R
+
,
where C is the core of the supermodular capacity ν.
We now give a characterization of the solution to Problem 6.1 similar to that of Section
5. For each Q P C, consider the following problem
(6.2) sup
Y PBpΣq
#ż
u pW0 ´ Π´X ` Y q dP
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ 0 ď Y ď X,
ż
Y dQ ď R
+
,
That is, (6.2) is a problem similar to (6.1) but (ideally) involves an insurer who is an
EU-maximizer, with Q P C being the probability representing the non-ambiguous beliefs
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of the insurer. If Q is compatible with P , then by Theorem 4.6, Problem (6.2) admits a
solution that is comonotonic with X . Let us denote by Y ˚ pQq this optimal solution.
Proposition 6.1. If the capacity ν is supermodular with core C, and if every Q P C is
compatible with P , then there exists a Q˚ P C such that Y ˚ pQ˚q is a solution to Problem
(6.1).
The proof of Proposition 6.1 is given in Appendix J. Again, Proposition 6.1 shows that one
can replicate the solution of Problem 6.1 by the solution of a problem with non-ambiguous
but heterogeneous beliefs, such as the one studied by Ghossoub [17].
The MLR Case. Suppose now that the supermodular capacity ν with core C is such that
all elements of C are absolutely continuous9 with respect to the probability measure P . By
the Radon-Nikody´m Theorem [13, Th. 4.2.2], the core C of ν is isometrically isomorphic
to the collection Ξ of corresponding Radon-Nikody´m derivatives, where:
(6.3) Ξ :“
#
φQ
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ φQ ˝X “ dQdP , Q P C
+
.
Definition 6.2 (Monotone Likelihood Ratio). The core C of ν is said to have the
Monotone Likelihood Ratio (MLR) property with respect to P if each φQ P Ξ is a nonin-
creasing function.
The following result states that whenever the core of ν has the MLR property with
respect to P , the optimal indemnity schedule is a state-dependent deductible.
Corollary 6.3. Suppose that assumptions 2.1, 4.1, and 5.3 hold, and suppose that the
capacity ν is supermodular with core C. Let Ξ denote the set of corresponding Radon-
Nikody´m derivatives. If C has the MLR property with respect to P , and if all functions
9A probability measure Q on the measurable space pS,Σq is said to be absolutely continuous with respect
to the probability measure P on pS,Σq if for any A P Σ, P pAq “ 0 ùñ Q pAq “ 0.
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φQ P Ξ are continuous, then there exists Q
˚ P C such that the function
(6.4) Y ˚ “
$’’&’%
X if R ě
ş
XdQ˚,
min
«
X,max
´
0, X ´ d pφQ˚q
¯ﬀ
if R ă
ş
XdQ˚,
is a solution to Problem (6.1), where:
‚ d pφQ˚q “W0 ´ Π´ pu
1q´1
´
λ˚ φQ˚ ˝X
¯
;
‚ φQ˚ ˝X “ dQ
˚{dP ; and,
‚ λ˚ ě 0 is chosen such that
ş
Y ˚ dQ˚ “ R.
Equation (6.4) is sufficient for an optimal solution. The proof of Corollary 6.3 is given
in Appendix K. Obviously, one recovers Arrow’s result from Theorem 6.3 when C consists
of only the probability measure P . By an argument similar to that of Proposition 5.5, we
also have the following result.
Proposition 6.4. If the assumptions of Corollary 6.3 hold, then:
(1) If Y is a solution to Problem (6.1), then Y is comonotonic with X, except possibly
on a set of probability zero under P .
(2) The optimal indemnity schedule Y ˚ given in eq. (6.4) is a nondecreasing function
of the loss random variable X.
(3) If Z˚ is any other indemnity schedule which is a nondecreasing function of X and
is identically distributed as Y ˚, then Z˚ “ Y ˚, P -a.s.
Finally, Proposition 6.5 below parallels Proposition 5.6.
Proposition 6.5. Under the assumptions of Corollary 6.3, the optimal indemnity sched-
ule Y ˚ given in eq. (6.4) satisfies the following property: If s1, s2 P S are such that
d pφQ˚q ps1q ă X ps1q and X ps2q ď d pφQ˚q ps2q , then it follows that X ps2q ă X ps1q .
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7. Conclusion
In this paper, we re-examined Arrow’s [5] classical problem of insurance demand by
introducing ambiguity on the side of the insurer. We showed that if the ambiguous beliefs of
the insurer satisfy a property of compatibility with the non-ambiguous beliefs of the insured,
then there exists an optimal indemnity schedule. Moreover, optimal indemnity schedules
are nondecreasing functions of the insurable random loss. We also showed that if the
insurer is either ambiguity-seeking or ambiguity-averse in the sense of Schmeidler [41], then
an optimal indemnity schedule can be replicated by one arising from a problem where both
parties have non-ambiguous but heterogeneous beliefs. Under additional assumptions, we
found an explicit form for the optimal indemnity schedule – both the in case of ambiguity-
aversion and of ambiguity-seeking – and showed that our results are natural extensions of
those of Arrow [5].
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Appendix A. Capacities and Choquet Integration
Definition A.1. A (normalized) capacity on a measurable space pS,Σq is a set function
ν : ΣÑ r0, 1s such that
(1) ν p∅q “ 0;
(2) ν pSq “ 1; and,
(3) ν is monotone: for any A,B P Σ, A Ď B ñ ν pAq ď ν pBq.
The capacity ν is said to be:
‚ supermodular if ν pA YBq ` ν pAXBq ě ν pAq ` ν pBq, for all A,B P Σ; and,
‚ submodular if ν pA YBq ` ν pAXBq ď ν pAq ` ν pBq, for all A,B P Σ.
For instance, if pS,Σ, P q is a probability space and T : r0, 1s Ñ r0, 1s is an increasing
function, such that T p0q “ 0 and T p1q “ 1, then the set function ν :“ T ˝P is a capacity on
pS,Σq called a distorted probability measure. The function T is usually called a probability
distortion. If, moreover, the distortion function T is convex (resp. concave), then the
capacity ν “ T ˝ P is supermodular (resp. submodular) [14, Ex. 2.1].
Definition A.2. Let ν1 be a supermodular capacity and ν2 a submodular capacity on
pS,Σq.
‚ The core of ν1, denoted by core pν1q, is the collection of all probability measures Q
on pS,Σq such that Q pAq ě ν pAq , @A P Σ.
‚ The anti-core of ν2, denoted by acore pνq, is the collection of all probability measures
Q on pS,Σq such that Q pAq ď ν pAq , @A P Σ.
Definition A.3. A capacity ν on pS,Σq is continuous from above (resp. below) if for any
sequence tAnuně1 Ď Σ such that An`1 Ď An (resp. An`1 Ě An) for each n, it holds that
lim
nÑ`8
ν pAnq “ ν
˜
`8č
n“1
An
¸ ˜
resp. lim
nÑ`8
ν pAnq “ ν
˜
`8ď
n“1
An
¸¸
A capacity that is continuous both from above and below is said to be continuous.
For instance, if ν is a distorted probability measure of the form T ˝ P where T is a
continuous function, then ν is a continuous capacity.
Definition A.4. Let ν be a capacity on pS,Σq. The Choquet integral of Y P B pΣq with
respect to ν is defined byż
Y dν :“
ż `8
0
ν pts P S : Y psq ě tuq dt`
ż
0
´8
rν pts P S : Y psq ě tuq ´ 1s dt,
where the integrals are taken in the sense of Riemann.
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Definition A.5. Two functions Y1, Y2 P B pΣq are said to be comonotonic if”
Y1 psq ´ Y1 ps
1q
ı”
Y2 psq ´ Y2 ps
1q
ı
ě 0, for all s, s1 P S.
For instance any Y P B pΣq is comonotonic with any c P R. Moreover, if Y1, Y2 P B pΣq,
and if Y2 is of the form Y2 “ I ˝ Y1, for some Borel-measurable function I, then Y2 is
comonotonic with Y1 if and only if the function I is nondecreasing.
The Choquet integral with respect to a (countably additive) measure is the usual Lebesgue
integral with respect to that measure [33, p. 59]. Unlike the Lebesgue integral, the Choquet
integral is not an additive operator on B pΣq. However, the Choquet integral is additive
over comonotonic functions.
Proposition A.6. Let ν be a capacity on pS,Σq.
(1) If φ1, φ2 P B pΣq are comonotonic, then
ş
pφ1 ` φ2q dν “
ş
φ1 dν `
ş
φ2 dν.
(2) If φ1, φ2 P B pΣq are such that φ1 ď φ2, then
ş
φ1 dν ď
ş
φ2 dν.
(3) For all φ P B pΣq and all c ě 0, then
ş
cφ dν “ c
ş
φ dν.
(4) If ν is submodular, then for any φ1, φ2 P B pΣq,
ş
pφ1 ` φ2q dν ď
ş
φ1 dν `
ş
φ2 dν.
Appendix B. P -Compatible Capacities
In robust statistics, capacities have a long history (e.g. [24]). An important class of capac-
ities used in robust statistics is the class of symmetric capacities introduced by Wasserman
and Kadane [44] and Kadane and Wasserman [29].
Definition B.1. Let pS,Σ, P q be a probability space. A capacity ν on pS,Σq is said to be:
(1) Wasserman-Kadane P -symmetric if for any two random variables Z1 and Z2 on
pS,Σ, P q that are identically distributed for P , one has
ş
Z1dν “
ş
Z2dν.
(2) Weakly P -symmetric if for any A,B P Σ, one has: P pAq “ P pBq ñ ν pAq “ ν pBq .
The probability measure P is clearly Wasserman-Kadane P -symmetric and weakly P -
symmetric. Another example of a weakly P -symmetric capacity is a distorted probability
measure of the form T ˝ P .
All probability measures on the measurable space pS,Σq that are either Wasserman-
Kadane P -symmetric or weakly P -symmetric are indeed P -compatible:
Proposition B.2. Let pS,Σ, P q be a probability space. If ν is a capacity on pS,Σq such that
ν is either Wasserman-Kadane P -symmetric or weakly P -symmetric, then ν is compatible
with P . In particular, the probability measure P , and any distortion T ˝P of the probability
measure P are compatible with P .
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Proof. Let Y1, Y2 P B
` pΣq be identically distributed under P . Then so are ´Y1 and ´Y2.
In particular, P r´Y1 ě ts “ P r´Y2 ě ts, for all t P R. Then, if ν is weakly P -symmetric,
we also have νr´Y1 ě ts “ νr´Y2 ě ts, for all t P R. Hence,
ş
´Y2dν “
ş
´Y1dν,
and so ´
ş
´Y2dν “ ´
ş
´Y1dν. If ν is Wasserman-Kadane P -symmetric, then we haveş
´Y2dν “
ş
´Y1dν. In both cases, we have ´
ş
´Y2dν “ ´
ş
´Y1dν. Therefore, in both
cases, we have
´
ż
´Y2dν “ ´
ż
´Y1dν.
Consequently, ν is compatible with P . Finally, since any distorted probability measure
of the form T ˝ P is a P -symmetric capacity, it follows that any distortion T ˝ P of the
probability measure P is compatible with P . 
Another important class of capacities that has also been used in robust statistics is
the class of coherent capacities, or upper probabilities (see Walley [42] and Kadane and
Wasserman [29]).
Definition B.3. Let pS,Σq be a measurable space. A capacity ν on pS,Σq is said to be
coherent if there exists a nonempty collection C of probability measures on pS,Σq such that
(B.1) ν pAq “ sup
QPC
Q pAq , for all A P Σ
By a result of Schmeidler [40], a subclass of coherent capacities is the collection of all
capacities that are submodular: any submodular capacity can be represented as coherent
capacities of the form (B.1), where the set C is the anticore of ν.
Proposition B.4. If ν is a submodular (and hence coherent) capacity on pS,Σ, P q such
that each element of the anticore of ν is either weakly P -symmetric or Wasserman-Kadane
P -symmetric, then ν is compatible with P .
Proof. Denote by C the anticore of ν. Let Y1, Y2 P B
` pΣq be identically distributed under
P . In particular, P rY1 ě ts “ P rY2 ě ts, for all t P R. Then:
(1) If each element of the anticore of ν is weakly P -symmetric, then we also have
QrY1 ě ts “ QrY2 ě ts, for all t P R and for all Q P C. Hence,
ş
Y2dQ “
ş
Y1dQ, for
all Q P C.
(2) If each element of the anticore of ν is Wasserman-Kadane P -symmetric, then we
have
ş
Y2dQ “
ş
Y1dQ, for all Q P C.
In both cases, we have
ş
´Y2dQ “
ş
´Y1dQ, for all Q P C. Therefore, since ν is submodular,
with anticore C, we haveż
´Y2dν “ max
QPC
ż
´Y2dQ “ max
QPC
ż
´Y1dQ “
ż
´Y1dν.
Therefore, ν is compatible with P . 
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A similar result holds for supermodular capacities, an important example of lower prob-
abilities. By a result of Schmeidler [40], if ν is a supermodular capacity with core C,
then
ν pAq “ inf
QPC
Q pAq , for all A P Σ.
Proposition B.5. If ν is a convex capacity on pS,Σ, P q such that each element of the
core of ν is either weakly P -symmetric or Wasserman-Kadane P -symmetric, then ν is
compatible with P .
The proof of Proposition B.5 is similar to that of Proposition B.4.
Appendix C. Rearrangements and Supermodularity
Here, the idea of an equimeasurable rearrangement of a random variable with respect to
another random variable is discussed. All proofs, additional results and references to the
literature may be found in Ghossoub [18, 19].
C.1. The Nondecreasing Rearrangement. Consider the setting of Section 2, and let
ζ be the probability law of X defined by ζ pBq :“ P ˝X´1 pBq “ P
´!
s P S : X psq P B
)¯
,
for any Borel subset B of R.
Definition C.1. For any Borel-measurable map I : r0,Ms Ñ R, define the distribution
function of I as the map ζI : RÑ r0, 1s defined by
(C.1) ζI ptq :“ ζ
´!
x P r0,Ms : I pxq ď t
)¯
.
Then ζI is a nondecreasing right-continuous function.
Definition C.2. Let I : r0,Ms Ñ r0,Ms be any Borel-measurable map and define the
function rI : r0,Ms Ñ R by
(C.2) rI ptq :“ inf !z P R` ˇˇˇ ζI pzq ě ζ` r0, ts ˘).
The following proposition gives some useful properties of the map rI defined above.
Proposition C.3. Let I : r0,Ms Ñ r0,Ms be any Borel-measurable map and let rI :
r0,Ms Ñ R be defined as in equation (C.2). Then the following hold:
(1) rI is left-continuous, nondecreasing and Borel-measurable;
(2) rI p0q “ 0 and rI pMq ďM . Therefore rI pr0,Msq Ď r0,Ms;
(3) If I1, I2 : r0,Ms Ñ r0,Ms are such that I1 ď I2, ζ-a.s., then rI1 ď rI2;
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(4) rI is ζ-equimeasurable with I, in the sense that for any Borel set B,
(C.3) ζ
´!
t P r0,Ms : I ptq P B
)¯
“ ζ
´!
t P r0,Ms : rI ptq P B)¯;
(5) If I : r0,Ms Ñ R` is another nondecreasing, Borel-measurable map which is ζ-
equimeasurable with I, then I “ rI, ζ-a.s.
rI is called the nondecreasing ζ-rearrangement of I. Now, define Y :“ I ˝ X and rY :“rI ˝X . Then:
(1) Y, rY P B` pΣq, since I and rI are Borel-measurable mappings of r0,Ms into itself;
(2) rY is a nondecreasing function of X :”
X psq ď X ps1q
ı
ñ
”rY psq ď rY ps1q ı, for all s, s1 P S; and,
(3) Y and rY have the same distribution under P (i.e., they are P -equimeasurable):
P
´!
s P S : Y psq ď α
)¯
“ P
´!
s P S : rY psq ď α)¯, for any α P r0,Ms.
Call rY a nondecreasing P -rearrangement of Y with respect to X and denote it by rYP .
Then rYP is P -a.s. unique. Note also that if Y1 and Y2 are P -equimeasurable; and, for any
Borel-measurable function ψ, ψ pY1q is P -integrable if and only if ψ pY2q is P -integrable, in
which case we have
ş
ψ pY1q dP “
ş
ψ pY2q dP .
Lemma C.4. Fix Y P B` pΣq and let rYP denote the nondecreasing P -rearrangement of Y
with respect to X. If 0 ď Y ď X, P -a.s., then 0 ď rYP ď X.
C.2. Supermodularity.
Definition C.5. A function L : R2 Ñ R is supermodular if for any x1, x2, y1, y2 P R with
x1 ď x2 and y1 ď y2, one has
(C.4) L px2, y2q ` L px1, y1q ě L px1, y2q ` L px2, y1q .
A function L : R2 Ñ R is called strictly supermodular if for any x1, x2, y1, y2 P R with
x1 ă x2 and y1 ă y2, one has
(C.5) L px2, y2q ` L px1, y1q ą L px1, y2q ` L px2, y1q .
Lemma C.6. A function L : R2 Ñ R is supermodular (resp. strictly supermodular) if and
only if the function η pyq :“ L px` h, yq ´ L px, yq is nondecreasing (resp. increasing) on
R, for any x P R and h ě 0 (resp. h ą 0).
Example C.7. If g : RÑ R is concave and a P R, then the function L1 : R
2 Ñ R defined
by L1 px, yq “ g pa´ x` yq is supermodular. If, moreover, g is strictly concave then L1 is
strictly supermodular.
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Lemma C.8 (Hardy-Littlewood). Fix Y P B` pΣq and let rYP denote the nondecreasing
P -rearrangement of Y with respect to X. If L is supermodular, then (assuming integrabil-
ity) we have ż
L
´
X, Y
¯
dP ď
ż
L
´
X, rYP¯ dP.
Moreover, if L is strictly supermodular then equality holds if and only if Y “ rYP , P -a.s.
Appendix D. Proof of Theorem 4.6
Let us denote by FSB the feasibility set for Problem (4.1) (which we assume nonempty
to rule out trivial situations): FSB “
!
Y P B pΣq : 0 ď Y ď X and ´
ş
´Y dν ď R
)
.
Let FÒSB be the set of all the Y P FSB which, in addition, are comonotonic with X :
FÒSB “
!
Y “ I ˝X P FSB : I is nondecreasing
)
.
Lemma D.1. If ν is compatible with P , then for each Y P FSB there exists a rY P FSB
such that:
(1) rY is comonotonic with X;
(2)
ş
u
´
W0 ´ Π´X ` rY ¯ dP ě ş u´W0 ´ Π ´X ` Y ¯dP ; and,
(3) ´
ş
´rY dν ď ´ ş´Y dν.
Proof. Choose any Y “ I˝X P FSB, and let rYP denote the nondecreasing P -rearrangement
of Y with respect to X . Then (i) rYP “ rI˝X where rI is nondecreasing, and (ii) 0 ď rYP ď X ,
by Lemma C.4. Furthermore, since ν is compatible with P , it follows that ´
ş
´rYPdν ď
´
ş
´Y dν. But ´
ş
´Y dν ď R since Y P FSB. Hence, rYP P FÒSB. Moreover, since
the utility u is concave (Assumption 4.1), the function U px, yq “ u pW0 ´ Π´ x` yq is
supermodular (as in Example C.7 (1)). Then, by Lemma C.8,
ş
u
´
W0 ´ Π´X ` rY ¯ dP ěş
u
´
W0 ´ Π´X ` Y
¯
dP . 
Now, by Lemma D.1, we can choose a maximizing sequence tYnun in F
Ò
SB for Problem
(4.1). That is,
lim
nÑ`8
ż
u pW0 ´ Π´X ` Ynq dP “ N ” sup
Y PB`pΣq
ż
u pW0 ´ Π ´X ` Y q dP ă `8.
Since 0 ď Yn ď X ď M ” }X}8, the sequence tYnun is uniformly bounded. Moreover,
for each n ě 1 we have Yn “ In ˝X , with In : r0,Ms Ñ r0,Ms. Consequently, the sequence
tInun is a uniformly bounded sequence of nondecreasing Borel-measurable functions. Thus,
by Helly’s First Theorem [11, Lemma 13.15] (a.k.a. Helly’s Compactness Theorem), there
is a nondecreasing function I˚ : r0,Ms Ñ r0,Ms and a subsequence tImum of tInun such
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that tImum converges pointwise on r0,Ms to I
˚. Hence, I˚ is also Borel-measurable,
and so Y ˚ “ I˚ ˝ X P B`pΣq is such that 0 ď Y ˚ ď X . Moreover, the sequence tYmum,
Ym “ Im˝X , converges pointwise to Y
˚. Thus, the sequence t´Ymum is uniformly bounded
and converges pointwise to ´Y ˚. By the assumption that ν is continuous, it follows from
a Dominated Convergence-type Theorem [43, Theorem 11.9] that
lim
mÑ`8
´
ż
´Ymdν “ ´
ż
´Y ˚dν ď R,
and so Y ˚ P FÒSB. Now, since the function u is continuous (Assumption 4.1), it is bounded
on any closed and bounded subset of R. Therefore, since the range of X is closed and
bounded, Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence Theorem [2, Theorem 11.21] implies thatż
u pW0 ´ Π ´X ` Y
˚q dP “ lim
mÑ`8
ż
u pW0 ´ Π ´X ` Ymq dP
“ lim
nÑ`8
ż
u pW0 ´ Π´X ` Ynq dP “ N.
Hence Y ˚ solves Problem (4.1).
Finally, suppose that Y is a solution to Problem (4.1). If Y is comonotonic with X ,
then the proof of Theorem 4.6 is complete. Suppose now that Y is not comonotonic with
X , that is, there exist some s1, s2 P S such that X ps1q ă X ps2q but Y ps1q ą Y ps2q. LetrY denote the (P -a.s. unique) nondecreasing rearrangement of Y with respect to X .
Suppose that P rY ‰ rY s ą 0. Since Y is optimal for Problem (4.1), it is, in particular
feasible. Therefore, 0 ď Y ď X and ´
ş
´Y dν ď R. By Lemma C.4, we have that
0 ď rY ď X . Moreover, since ν is compatible with P , we have that and ´ ş´rY dν ď
´
ş
´Y dν ď R. Hence, in particular, rY is feasible for Problem (4.1). Moreover, since the
function u is strictly concave (Assumption 4.1), it follows that the function L px, yq :“
u pW0 ´ Π´ x` yq is strictly supermodular (see Example C.7). Therefore, Lemma C.8
implies that
ş
u
´
W0 ´ Π´X ` rY ¯ dP ą ş u pW0 ´ Π´X ` Y q dP, contradicting the fact
that Y is optimal for Problem (4.1).
Therefore, it must be that P rY ‰ rY s “ 0, that is, Y “ rY , P -a.s. Hence, Y is comnonotonic
with X, except on a set of probability zero under P . This concludes the proof of Theorem
4.6. l
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 5.1
Let AC denote the anticore of ν. Since each Q P AC is compatible with P , it follows that
ν is compatible with P . Hence, by Theorem 4.6, there exists a solution Y ˚˚ to Problem
(5.1). Fix Q P AC arbitrarily, and let Y ˚ pQq be an optimal solution of Problem (5.2) for
this given Q P AC. The existence of Y ˚ pQq follows from the fact that Q is compatible with
P , in light of Theorem 4.6. Then, Y ˚ pQq satisfies 0 ď Y ˚ pQq ď X and
ş
Y ˚ pQq dQ ď R.
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Hence,
min
µPAC
ż
Y ˚ pQq dµ ď
ż
Y ˚ pQq dQ ď R,
which shows that Y ˚ pQq is feasible for Problem (5.1). Since Y ˚˚ solves Problem (5.1), we
must have that
(E.1)
ż
u pW0 ´ Π ´X ` Y
˚˚q dP ě
ż
u pW0 ´ Π´X ` Y
˚ pQqq dP.
Therefore, to conclude the proof, it suffices to find some Q˚˚ P AC such that inequality
(J.2) holds as an equality. Suppose, by the way of contradiction, that no such Q˚˚ exists.
Then, for all Q P AC it holds that
(E.2)
ż
u pW0 ´ Π ´X ` Y
˚˚q dP ą
ż
u pW0 ´ Π´X ` Y
˚ pQqq dP.
Since, by definition, Y ˚pQq solves the problem of type (5.2) defined by Q, inequality (E.2)
implies that Y ˚˚ must not be feasible for any problem of the type (5.2). That is, for all
Q P AC, ż
Y ˚˚dQ ą R.
However, by the feasibility of Y ˚˚ for Problem (5.1), we have that for all Q P AC,ż
Y ˚˚dQ ą R ě min
µPAC
ż
Y ˚˚dµ,
which, since Y ˚˚ P B pΣq, contradicts the fact that AC is weak˚-compact and convex. l
Appendix F. Proof of Theorem 5.4
Suppose that assumptions 2.1, 4.1, 4.4, 5.2, and 5.3 all hold. Let H :“
!
Y P B pΣq
ˇˇˇ
0 ď
Y ď X and ´
ş
´Y dT ˝P ď R
)
denote the feasibility set of Problem (5.3). Then it is easy
to verify that H ‰ ∅. For each Y P B` pΣq, let FY ptq :“ P
`
ts P S : Y psq ď tu
˘
denote
the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of Y with respect to the probability measure P ,
and let F´1Y ptq be the left-continuous inverse of the cdf FY (i.e., the quantile function of
Y ), defined by
(F.1) F´1Y ptq :“ inf
!
z P R`
ˇˇˇ
FY pzq ě t
)
, @t P r0, 1s .
Lemma F.1. We have
(1) U :“ FX pXq is a random variable on the probability space pS,Σ, P q with a uniform
distribution on p0, 1q; and,
(2) X “ F´1X pUq , P -a.s.
Moreover, for each Y P H, the function Y ˚ defined by Y ˚ :“ F´1Y pFX pXqq is such that:
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(1) Y ˚ P H;
(2) Y ˚ is comonotonic with X;
(3)
ş
u pW0 ´ Π´X ` Y
˚q dP ě
ş
u pW0 ´ Π ´X ` Y q dP ; and,
(4) ´
ş
´Y ˚ dT ˝ P “ ´
ş
´Y dT ˝ P .
Proof. Since, by assumption, X is a continuous random variable on the probability space
pS,Σ, P q, the Borel probability measure ζ :“ P ˝X´1 is nonatomic. For each Y P B` pΣq,
one can then define the P -a.s. unique nondecreasing P -rearrangement rY of Y with respect
to X , as in Appendix C.
Fix some Y P B` pΣq, and let Y ˚ :“ F´1Y pFX pXqq. Then Y can be written as φ ˝X for
some nonnegative Borel-measurable and bounded map φ on X pSq. Define the mappingrφ : r0,Ms Ñ r0,Ms as in Appendix C (see equation (C.2) on p. 24) to be the nondecreasing
ζ-rearrangement of φ, that is,rφ ptq :“ inf !z P R` ˇˇˇ ζ`tx P r0,Ms : φ pxq ď zu˘ ě ζ` r0, ts ˘).
Then, as in Appendix C, rY “ rφ ˝X . Therefore, for each s0 P S,rY ps0q “ rφ pX ps0qq “ inf !z P R` ˇˇˇ ζ`tx P r0,Ms : φ pxq ď zu˘ ě ζ` r0, X ps0qs ˘).
However, for each s0 P S,
ζ
`
r0, X ps0qs
˘
“ P ˝X´1
`
r0, X ps0qs
˘
“ FX pX ps0qq :“ FX pXq ps0q .
Moreover,
ζ
`
tx P r0,Ms : φ pxq ď zu
˘
“ P ˝X´1
`
tx P r0,Ms : φ pxq ď zu
˘
“ P
`
ts P S : φ pX psqq ď zu
˘
“ FY pzq .
Consequently, for each s0 P S,rY ps0q “ inf !z P R` ˇˇˇ FY pzq ě FX pXq ps0q) “ F´1Y pFX pX ps0qqq :“ F´1Y pFX pXqq ps0q .
That is, rY “ F´1Y pFX pXqq ,
where F´1Y is the left-continuous inverse of FY , as defined in equation (F.1). Hence the func-
tion Y ˚ coincides with the function rY , the equimeasurable nondecreasing P -rearrangement
of Y with respect to X .
In particular, the P -a.s. unique equimeasurable nondecreasing P -rearrangement of X
with respect to itself is given by F´1X pFX pXqq. Since X is a nondecreasing function of X
and P -equimeasurable with X , it follows from the P -a.s. uniqueness of the equimeasurable
nondecreasing P -rearrangement (see Proposition C.3) that X “ F´1X pFX pXqq, P -a.s. (see
also [16, Lemma A.21]). Moreover, since ζ “ P ˝ X´1 is nonatomic, it follows that U :“
FX pXq has a uniform distribution over p0, 1q [16, Lemma A.21], that is, P
`
ts P S :
FX pXq psq ď tu
˘
“ t for each t P p0, 1q.
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Now, let Y P H be given and let rY denote the nondecreasing P -rearrangement of Y with
respect to X . Then rY “ F´1Y pFX pXqq “ Y ˚, Y ˚ is comonotonic with X, and 0 ď Y ˚ ď X
since 0 ď Y ď X (see Lemma C.4). Also, since Y and rY are P -equimeasurable, we
have
ş
Y ˚ dT ˝ P “
ş
Y dT ˝ P and ´
ş
´Y ˚ dT ˝ P “ ´
ş
´Y dT ˝ P . Moreover, since
the function u is concave, the function U
´
X, Y
¯
“ u pW0 ´ Π´X ` Y q is supermodular
(Example C.7). Therefore, by Lemma C.8, it follows that
ş
u pW0 ´ Π´X ` Y
˚q dP ěş
u pW0 ´ Π´X ` Y q dP. 
Therefore, Lemma F.1 implies that for each Y P H the following holds:
(i)
ş
u
`
W0 ´ Π´ F
´1
X pUq ` F
´1
Y pUq
˘
dP ě
ş
u pW0 ´ Π ´X ` Y q dP ;
(ii)
ş
F´1Y pUq dT ˝ P “
ş
Y dT ˝ P ; and,
(iii) ´
ş
´F´1Y pUq dT ˝ P “ ´
ş
´Y dT ˝ P .
Hence, by Lemma F.1, one can look for a solution to Problem (5.3) of the form F´1 pUq,
where F is the cdf of a function Z P B` pΣq such that 0 ď Z ď X and ´
ş
´Z dT ˝P ď R.
Now, for any given Y P B` pΣq, if Y ˚ “ F´1Y pFX pXqq “ F
´1
Y pUq, then one can write
10ż
Y ˚ dT ˝ P “
ż
F´1Y pUq dT ˝ P
“
ż
1
0
T 1 p1´ tqF´1Y ptq dt “
ż
T 1 p1´ UqF´1Y pUq dP,
and
´
ż
´Y ˚ dT ˝ P “ ´
ż
´F´1Y pUq dT ˝ P “ ´
ż
F´1´Y p1´ Uq dT ˝ P
“ ´
ż
1
0
T 1 p1´ tqF´1´Y ptq dt “ ´
ż
1
0
´T 1 p1´ tqF´1Y p1´ tq dt
“
ż
T 1 p1´ UqF´1Y p1´ Uq dP “
ż
T 1 pUqF´1Y pUq dP,
and ż
u pW0 ´ Π ´X ` Y
˚q dP “
ż
u
`
W0 ´ Π´ F
´1
X pUq ` F
´1
Y pUq
˘
dP
“
ż
1
0
u
`
W0 ´ Π´ F
´1
X ptq ` F
´1
Y ptq
˘
dt.
Definition F.2. Let Q denote the collection of all quantile functions. That is,
(F.2) Q :“
!
f : p0, 1q Ñ R
ˇˇˇ
f is nondecreasing and left-continuous
)
.
10This is a standard exercise. See, for instance, [28, p. 418] or [22, p. 213].
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Let Q˚ denote the collection of all quantile functions f P Q of the form F´1, where F is
the cdf of some function Y P B` pΣq such that 0 ď Y ď X . That is,
(F.3) Q˚ “
!
f P Q
ˇˇˇ
0 ď f pzq ď F´1X pzq , for each 0 ă z ă 1
)
.
Now, let U “ FX pXq and consider the following problem.
(F.4) sup
fPQ˚
#ż
u
`
W0 ´ Π´ F
´1
X pUq ` f pUq
˘
dP
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
ż
T 1 pUq f pUq dP ď R
+
.
Proposition F.3 (Quantile Characterization). If f˚ is optimal for Problem (F.4),
then the function f˚ pUq is optimal for Problem (5.3).
Proof. By Lemma F.1, X “ F´1X pUq , P -a.s. Therefore, for any quantile function f P Q,ż
u
`
W0 ´ Π ` f pUq ´ F
´1
X pUq
˘
dP “
ż
u pW0 ´ Π` f pUq ´Xq dP.
Let f˚ P Q˚ is optimal for Problem (F.4), and let Z˚ “ f˚ pUq. Then, by Lemma F.1,
Z˚ is feasible for Problem (5.3). To show optimality, let Z be any feasible solution for
Problem (5.3) and let F be the cdf of Z. Then, by Lemma F.1, the function rZ :“ F´1 pUq
is feasible for Problem (5.3), comonotonic with X and satisfies:
‚
ş
u
´
W0 ´ Π´X ` rZ¯ dP ě ş u pW0 ´ Π´X ` Zq dP ; and,
‚ ´
ş
´ rZ dT ˝ P “ ´ ş´Z dT ˝ P ď R.
Moreover, rZ has also F as a cdf. To show optimality of Z˚ “ f˚ pUq for Problem (5.3) it
remains to show thatż
u pW0 ´ Π ´X ` Z
˚q dP ě
ż
u
´
W0 ´ Π´X ` rZ¯ dP.
Now, let f :“ F´1, so that rZ “ f pUq. Since rZ is feasible for Problem (5.3), it follows that
R ě
ż
T 1 pUq f pUq dP.
Hence, f is feasible for Problem (F.4). Since f˚ is optimal for Problem (F.4), it follows
that ż
u pW0 ´ Π ´X ` Z
˚q dP ě
ż
u
´
W0 ´ Π´X ` rZ¯ dP.
Therefore, Z˚ “ f˚ pUq is optimal for Problem (5.3). 
Note that Proposition F.3 holds for any distortion function T , and the concavity of T
has not been used yet. Proposition F.3 allows us to focus on solving Problem (F.4), which
we now address.
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Lemma F.4. If f˚ P Q˚ satisfies the following:
(1)
ş
1
0
T 1 ptq f˚ ptq dt “ R,
(2) There exists λ ě 0 such that for all t P p0, 1q,
f˚ ptq “ argmax
0ďyďF´1
X
ptq
«
u
´
W0 ´ Π` y ´ F
´1
X ptq
¯
´ λT 1 ptq y
ﬀ
,
then f˚ solves Problem (F.4), and therefore, the function f˚ pUq is optimal for Problem
(5.3), where U “ FX pXq.
Proof. Suppose that f˚ P Q˚ satisfies conditions p1q and p2q above. Then, in particular,
f˚ is feasible for Problem (F.4). To show optimality of f˚ for Problem (F.4), let f by any
other feasible solution for Problem (F.4). Then
ş
1
0
T 1 ptq f ptq dt ď R and, for all t P p0, 1q,
u
´
W0´Π`f
˚ ptq´F´1X ptq
¯
´λT 1 ptq f˚ ptq ě u
´
W0´Π`f ptq´F
´1
X ptq
¯
´λT 1 ptq f ptq ,
that is,”
u
´
W0 ´Π` f
˚ ptq ´ F´1X ptq
¯
´ u
´
W0 ´Π` f ptq ´ F
´1
X ptq
¯ı
ě λT 1 ptq
”
f˚ ptq ´ f ptq
ı
.
Integrating yieldsż
1
0
u
´
W0 ´ Π ` f
˚ ptq´ F´1X ptq
¯
dt´
ż
1
0
u
´
W0 ´ Π` f ptq ´ F
´1
X ptq
¯
dt
ě λ
„
R ´
ż
1
0
T 1 ptq f ptq dt

ě 0,
or,ż
u
´
W0 ´ Π ` f
˚ pUq ´ F´1X pUq
¯
dP “
ż
1
0
u
´
W0 ´ Π ` f
˚ ptq ´ F´1X ptq
¯
dt
ě
ż
1
0
u
´
W0 ´ Π` f ptq ´ F
´1
X ptq
¯
dt “
ż
u
´
W0 ´ Π` f pUq ´ F
´1
X pUq
¯
dP,
as required. The rest follows from Proposition F.3. 
Lemma F.4 suggests that in order to find a solution for Problem (F.4), one can start by
solving the problem
(F.5) max
0ďfλptqďF
´1
X
ptq
”
u
´
W0 ´ Π` fλ ptq ´ F
´1
X ptq
¯
´ λT 1 ptq fλ ptq
ı
,
for a given λ ě 0 and for a fixed t P p0, 1q.
Lemma F.5. Let U “ FX pXq. An optimal solution for Problem (5.3) takes the form:
(F.6) Y˚ “ max
«
0,min
!
F´1X pUq , pu
1q
´1
pλ˚T 1 pUqq ` F´1X pUq ´W0 ` Π
)ﬀ
,
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where λ˚ is chosen so that
ş
T 1 pUqY˚ dP “ R.
Proof. For a given λ ě 0 and for a fixed t P p0, 1q consider the problem:
(F.7) max
fλptq
”
u
´
W0 ´ Π` fλ ptq ´ F
´1
X ptq
¯
´ λT 1 ptq fλ ptq
ı
.
By Assumption 4.1, the first-order conditions are sufficient for an optimum for Problem
(F.7) and they imply that the function
f˚λ ptq :“ pu
1q
´1
pλT 1 ptqq ` F´1X ptq ´W0 ` Π
solves Problem (F.7). Concavity of u and T imply that the function f˚λ : p0, 1q Ñ R
is nondecreasing, since F´1X is a nondecreasing function. Assumption 5.2 implies that the
function T 1 is continuous. Assumption 4.1 implies that the function pu1q´1 is continuous and
strictly decreasing (see Remark 4.2). This yields the left-continuity of f˚λ . Consequently,
f˚λ P Q, the set of all quantile functions.
Now, define the function f˚˚λ by
(F.8) f˚˚λ ptq :“ max
«
0,min
!
F´1X ptq , f
˚
λ ptq
)ﬀ
.
It is then easy to check that f˚˚λ P Q, since f
˚
λ P Q and since F
´1
X is a nondecreasing
function. Moreover, 0 ď f˚˚λ pzq ď F
´1
X pzq, for each z P p0, 1q. Therefore, f
˚˚
λ P Q
˚.
Finally, it is easily seen that f˚˚λ ptq solves Problem (F.5) for the given λ and t, since the
concavity of u yields the concavity of the function z ÞÑ u
´
W0´Π`z´F
´1
X ptq
¯
´λT 1 ptq z,
for each t P p0, 1q. Hence, in view of Lemma F.4, it remains to show that there exists a
λ˚ ě 0 such that
ş
1
0
T 1 ptq f˚˚λ˚ ptq dt “ R.
Let ψ be the function of the parameter λ ě 0 defined by
ψ pλq :“
ż
1
0
T 1 ptqmax
«
0,min
!
F´1X ptq , pu
1q
´1
pλT 1 ptqq ` F´1X ptq ´W0 ` Π
)ﬀ
dt.
It then suffices to show that there exists a λ˚ ě 0 such that ψ pλ˚q “ R. Since X is
bounded and since F´1X is nondecreasing, it follows that for each t P r0, 1s,
min
!
F´1X ptq , pu
1q
´1
pλT 1 ptqq ` F´1X ptq ´W0 ` Π
)
ď F´1X ptq ď F
´1
X p1q ď }X}sup ă `8.
Moreover, since T is concave and increasing, T 1 is nonincreasing and nonnegative, and so
for each t P r0, 1s, 0 ď T 1 ptq ď T 1 p0q. But Assumption 5.2 implies that the function T 1
is continuous, and hence bounded on every closed and bounded subset of R. Therefore,
T 1 p0q ă `8. Hence, for each t P r0, 1s,
min
!
F´1X ptq , pu
1q
´1
pλT 1 ptqq ` F´1X ptq ´W0 ` Π
)
T 1 ptq ď F´1X p1qT
1 p0q ă `8.
Hence, Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence Theorem [2, Theorem 11.21] implies that ψ is
a continuous function of λ. Moreover, ψ is a nonincreasing function of λ (by concavity of
u and by monotonicity of the Lebesgue integral).
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Now, Assumption 4.1 implies that
ψ p0q “
ż
1
0
T 1 ptqF´1X ptq dt “ ´
ż
´X dT ˝ P,
and that
lim
λÑ`8
ψ pλq “
ż
1
0
T 1 ptqmax
«
0,min
!
F´1X ptq , F
´1
X ptq ´W0 ` Π
)ﬀ
dt
“
ż
1
0
T 1 ptqmax
«
0, F´1X ptq ´W0 ` Π
ﬀ
dt.
Furthermore, by Assumption 5.3, FX pW0 ´ Πq “ 1. Therefore, for all t P p0, 1q, F
´1
X ptq ď
W0 ´ Π, and so
lim
λÑ`8
ψ pλq “ 0.
Consequently (recall Remark 4.3 and Assumption 4.4),
0 “ lim
λÑ`8
ψ pλq ď R ă ´
ż
´X dT ˝ P “
ż
1
0
T 1 ptqF´1X ptq dt “ ψ p0q .
Hence, by the Intermediate Value Theorem [38, Theorem 4.23], there exists a λ˚ ě 0 such
that ψ pλ˚q “ R. This concludes the proof of Lemma F.5. 
Now, since X is a continuous random variable for P , it follows from Lemma F.1 that
X “ F´1X pUq , P -a.s., where U “ FX pXq. Therefore,
max
«
0,min
!
F´1X pUq , pu
1q
´1
pλ˚T 1 pUqq ` F´1X pUq ´W0 ` Π
)ﬀ
“ max
«
0,min
!
X, pu1q
´1
pλ˚T 1 pUqq `X ´W0 ` Π
)ﬀ
, P -a.s.
Therefore, letting Y˚
2
“ max
«
0,min
!
X, pu1q´1 pλ˚T 1 pUqq`X´W0`Π
)ﬀ
, it follows thatż
T 1 pUqY˚
2
dP “
ż
T 1 pUqY˚ dP “ R,
and that ż
u pW0 ´ Π´X ` Y
˚
2
q dP “
ż
u pW0 ´ Π ´X ` Y
˚q dP.
In other words, Y˚
2
is also optimal for Problem (5.3). Define Y ˚ by
Y ˚ “ min
«
X,max
´
0, X ´ d pT q
¯ﬀ
,
where
d pT q “ W0 ´ Π ´ pu
1q
´1
´
λ˚T 1 pUq
¯
.
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It can then easily be verified that Y ˚ “ Y˚
2
. l
Appendix G. Proof of Proposition 5.5
(1) The proof is similar to that of that last part of Theorem 4.6.
(2) Since d pT q “ W0 ´ Π ´ pu
1q´1
´
λ˚T 1 pFX pXqq
¯
, the result follows immediately
from the fact that T 1 is nonincreasing (T is concave) and pu1q´1 is decreasing (u is
concave and increasing).
(3) The P -a.s. uniqueness property results from the property of the equimeasurable
nondecreasing rearrangement (Appendix C). l
Appendix H. Proof of Proposition 5.6
First, recall that d pT q “W0 ´ Π´ pu
1q´1 pλ˚T 1 pFX pXqqq , where:
‚ λ˚ ě 0;
‚ T 1 is nonincreasing (T is concave); and,
‚ pu1q´1 is decreasing (u is concave and increasing).
Lemma H.1. The function Φ : x ÞÑW0 ´ Π´ pu
1q´1 pλ˚T 1 pFX pxqqq is nonincreasing.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of the fact that T 1 is nonincreasing and pu1q´1 is de-
creasing. 
Now, let s1, s2 P S be such that
(H.1) 0 ă d pT q ps1q ă X ps1q and X ps2q ď d pT q ps2q ,
To show that X ps2q ă X ps1q, suppose, by way of contradiction, that X ps2q ě X ps1q.
Then, Lemma H.1 implies that
d pT q ps2q “ Φ pX ps2qq ď Φ pX ps1qq “ d pT q ps1q .
Therefore, since X ps2q ě X ps1q by assumption, we have (using eq. (H.1)),
d pT q ps2q ě X ps2q ě X ps1q ą d pT q ps1q .
Consequently,
d pT q ps2q ą d pT q ps1q ,
hence contradicting the fact that d pT q ps2q ď d pT q ps1q. Therefore, X ps2q ă X ps1q. l
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Appendix I. Proof of Corollary 5.7
By a proof identical to that of Theorem 5.4, an optimal indemnity schedule is given by
Y ˚ “ min
«
X,max
´
0, X ´ d
¯ﬀ
,
where d “ W0 ´ Π ´ pu
1q´1 pλ˚q, and λ˚ is such that
ş
Y ˚dP “ R “ Π
1`ρ
. It only remains
to show that, in this case, d ą 0. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that d ď 0. Then,
max
´
0, X´d
¯
“ X´d ě X , and so Y ˚ “ min
«
X,max
´
0, X´d
¯ﬀ
“ X . Therefore, R “ş
Y ˚dP “
ş
XdP , contradicting the fact that R ă ´
ş
´X dP “
ş
XdP (by Assumption
4.4, and since T is the identity function in this case). l
Appendix J. Proof of Proposition 6.1
For each Y P B pΣq, let
ru pY q “ ż u pW0 ´ Π´X ` Y q dP.
Let C denote the core of ν. Since each Q P C is compatible with P , it follows that ν is
compatible with P . Hence, by Theorem 4.6, there exists a solution Y ˚˚ to Problem (6.1).
Let
V “ ru pY ˚˚q
denote the value of Problem 6.1.
For a given Q P C, let M pQq denote Problem (6.2) for this given Q P C. Fix Q P C
arbitrarily, and let Y ˚ pQq be an optimal solution of Problem M pQq. The existence of
Y ˚ pQq follows from the fact that Q is compatible with P , in light of Theorem 4.6. For
any Q P C, let
V pQq “ ru pY pQqq
denote the value of Problem M pQq.
Since Y ˚˚ solves Problem (6.1), it is, in particular, feasible for Problem M pQq, for any
Q P C. Therefore,
V ď V pQq , @Q P C.
Hence, in order to conclude the proof of Proposition 6.1, it suffices to show that there
exists some Q˚ P C such that
V ě V pQ˚q .
To do this, we will show that the function
V : C ÝÑ R
Q ÞÝÑ V pQq “ ru pY pQqq
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attains its minimum on C, and that V ě min
QPC
V pQq.
The fact that V attains its minimum on C is a consequence of the Maximum Theorem
[2, Theorem 17.31] applied to the correspondence Γ : AC Ñ B pΣq defined by
Γ : Q Ñ
#
Y P B pΣq
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ 0 ď Y ď X and
ż
Y dQ ď R
+
.
Indeed, since C is weak˚-compact [33, Proposition 4.2], it suffices to show that V is weak˚-
continuous. When C and B pΣq are endowed with their weak˚ topologies, it is easy to
see that the function Y ÞÝÑ ru pY q is weak*-continuous (since P is a charge), and that
Γ is continuous and compact-valued. The weak˚-continuity of V then results from the
Maximum Theorem [2, Theorem 17.31]. Hence, argminV ‰ ∅.
Lemma J.1. If Y pQxq solves problem M pQyq, then Y pQxq “ Y pQyq, P -a.s.
Proof. By assumption, both Y pQxq and Y pQyq are feasible for MpQyq. Therefore, any
strict convex combination of Y pQxq and Y pQyq is also feasible for MpQyq. By strict
concavity of u and since rupY pQyqq “ rupY pQxqq, we haveż ”
u pW0 ´ Π´X ` αY pQxq ` p1´ αqY pQyqq ´ u pW0 ´ Π´X ` Y pQyqq
ı
dP ą 0
when P p|Y pQxq ´ Y pQyq| ‰ 0q ą 0. 
Now, since argmin V ‰ ∅, choose some Q0 P argminV . Then V pQ0q “ min
QPC
V pQq. Ifş
Y pQ0qdQ ď R for every Q P C, then Y pQ0q is feasible for Problem 6.1, and the proof of
Proposition 6.1 is done. So suppose that there exists Q1 P C such that
(J.1)
ż
Y pQ0qdQ1 ą R.
Then, in particular, Q1 ‰ Q0. Let Y pQ1q be a solution to problem M pQ1q. Then there
are two cases to consider:
(a)
ş
Y pQ1q dQ0 ą R; and,
(b)
ş
Y pQ1q dQ0 ď R.
We are going to show that (a) does not obtain. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that
we are in case (a). Then since
ş
Y pQ0qdQ0 ď R, it must be that Y pQ1q ‰ Y pQ0q, P -a.s.
Moreover, by (a) and eq. (J.1) we haveż
Y pQ0qdQ0 ď R,
ż
Y pQ0qdQ1 ą R,
ż
Y pQ1qdQ1 ď R, and
ż
Y pQ1qdQ0 ą R,
which implies thatż
rY pQ0q ´ Y pQ1qs dQ1 ą 0 ą
ż
rY pQ0q ´ Y pQ1qs dQ0.
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Hence, there exists α P p0, 1q such that
(J.2) α
ż
rY pQ0q ´ Y pQ1qs dQ1 ` p1´ αq
ż
rY pQ0q ´ Y pQ1qs dQ0 “ 0.
Notice that eq. (J.2) implies that
R ě
ż
Y pQ0qdQ0 “
ż
Y pQ1qdQ0`α¯
„ż
rY pQ0q ´ Y pQ1qs dQ0 ´
ż
rY pQ0q ´ Y pQ1qs dQ1

,
and henceż
rY pQ0q ´ Y pQ1qs dQ0 “ α
„ż
rY pQ0q ´ Y pQ1qs dQ0 ´
ż
rY pQ0q ´ Y pQ1qs dQ1

.(J.3)
Now, for each ε ą 0, let rY pεq “ εm1BM , where m ď }Y pQ0q }sup and 1BM is the indicator
function of the set BM “ ts P S : Y pQ0q psq ě mu. Then, by using eq. (J.3), we can write
for each β P p0, 1q, for each m, and for each ε ą 0ż
pβY pQ0q ` p1´ βqY pQ1q ´ rY pεqqdQ0
“
ż
Y pQ1qdQ0
` βα
„ż
rY pQ0q ´ Y pQ1qs dQ0 ´
ż
rY pQ0q ´ Y pQ1qs dQ1

´
ż rY pεq dQ0.
Then, for a given β P p0, 1q and m, ε can be chosen so that βY pQ0q` p1´βqY pQ1q´ rY pεq
is feasible for Problem M pQ0q.
Next observe that by strict concavity of u and by Y pQ1q ‰ Y pQ0q P -a.s., as observed
above, we have
lim
εÑ0
ru´βY pQ0q ` p1´ βqY pQ1q ´ rY pεq¯ “ ru´βY pQ0q ` p1´ βqY pQ1q¯
ą βru pY pQ0qq ` p1´ βqru pY pQ1qq
ě ru pY pQ0qq “ V pQ0q “ min
µPC
V pµq .
Hence, there exists ε ą 0 such that
ru´βY pQ0q ` p1´ βqY pQ1q ´ rY pεq¯ ą ru pY pQ0qq ,
which contradicts the fact that Y pQ0q is a solution for Problem MpQ0q.
In sum, for any Q0 P argminV , if there exists Q1 P C such that
ş
Y pQ0qdQ1 ą R, thenş
Y pQ1qdQ0 ď R. We can re-formulate this as the following result.
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Lemma J.2. Let Q0 P argminV , and let
IpQ0q “
#
Q P C
ˇˇˇ ż
Y pQ0qdQ ą R
+
.
Then:
(a) If Q P IpQ0q, then Y pQq is feasible for both Problem MpQ0q and Problem MpQq;
(b) IpQ0q Ă argminV .
Proof. Part (a) of the Lemma is the argument preceding it plus the obvious observation
that, by definition, Y pQq is feasible for Problem MpQq. To show part (b), note that
since Y pQq is feasible for Problem MpQ0q (by part (a)), we have V pQ0q “ ru pY pQ0qq ěru pY pQqq “ V pQq ě min
µPC
V pµq “ V pQ0q. Hence, Q P I pQ0q ùñ Q P argmin V . 
Let Q1 P I pQ0q Ă argminV , and let
I1 pQ1q “
#
Q P I pQ0q
ˇˇˇ ż
Y pQ1q dQ ą R
+
.
Lemma J.3. If Q P I1pQ1q, then Y pQq is feasible for problems MpQq, MpQ0q, and
MpQ1q.
Proof. The feasibility of Y pQq for problems MpQq and MpQ0q follows from Lemma J.2.
An argument similar to the one used in proving part (a) of Lemma J.2 also shows feasibility
of Y pQq for Problem MpQ1q. 
Lemma J.4. There exists Q˚ P C such that
ş
Y pQ0qdQ
˚ ą R and Y pQ˚q is feasible for
(and hence solves) Problem M pQq for all Q P I pQ0q Y tQ0u.
Proof. By transfinite induction (Zorn’s Lemma), using Lemma J.3, and using a construc-
tion similar to that of I1 pQ1q and I pQ0q. 
Lemma J.5. There exists Q˚ P argmin V such that Y pQ˚q is feasible for (and hence
solves) Problem M pQq for all Q P argminV .
Proof. Let Q˚ be the probability measure given in Lemma J.4, and let Q P argminV be
chosen arbitrarily. Then, either
(i) Q P IpQ0q Y tQ0u; or
(ii)
ş
Y pQ0qdQ ď R and Q ‰ Q0.
In case (i), Lemma J.4 implies that Y pQ˚q solves Problem M pQq.
In case (ii), since Q P argminV , it follows that Y pQ0q is also a solution for Problem
MpQq. Note also that since Q ‰ Q0, Lemma J.1 implies that Y pQ0q “ Y pQq P -a.s.
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Moreover, by an argument similar to that used in the proof of part (a) of Lemma J.2,
Y pQ˚q solves Problem MpQ0q, and Q
˚ ‰ Q0 (because
ş
Y pQ0qdQ0 ď R ă
ş
Y pQ0qdQ
˚).
Therefore, by Lemma J.1 we have Y pQ0q “ Y pQ
˚q P -a.s. Consequently, letting
A “
!
s P S : Y pQ0q psq “ Y pQ
˚q psq
)
and B “
!
s P S : Y pQ0q psq “ Y pQq psq
)
,
we have P pAq “ P pBq “ 1, andż
Y pQ˚qdQ “
ż
A
Y pQ˚qdQ “
ż
A
Y pQ0q dQ “
ż
AXB
Y pQ0q dQ “
ż
AXB
Y pQq dQ
“
ż
Y pQqdQ ď R.
That is, Y pQ˚q is feasible for (and hence solves) Problem MpQq.
Since Q was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that Y pQ˚q is feasible for (and hence solves)
Problem MpQq for all Q P argminV . 
Proposition There exists Q˚ P C such that Y pQ˚q solves Problem 6.1.
Proof of the Proposition: Let Q˚ be given from Lemma J.5. We are going to show thatż
Y pQ˚qdQ ď R, @Q P C.
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists rQ P C such that ş Y pQ˚qd rQ ą R.
By Lemma J.2, rQ P argminV . By Lemma J.5, Y pQ˚q solves Problem Mp rQq. Hence, in
particular
ş
Y pQ˚qd rQ ď R, a contradiction. It follows that Y pQ˚q is feasible in all problems
MpQq, and hence Y pQ˚q is feasible for Problem 6.1. This implies that V ě ru pY pQ˚qq “
min
µPC
V pµq. l
Appendix K. Proof of Corollary 6.3
By a result of Ghossoub [17], the MLR property implies compatibility with P : since
every element of the core of ν has a nonincreasing Radon-Nikody´m derivative with respect
to P , every element of the core of ν is compatible with P [17]. Therefore, the supermodular
capacity ν is itself compatible with P . Hence, by Proposition 6.1, there exists a Q˚ P C
such that a solution to Problem (6.1) is given by a solution to the following problem:
(K.1) sup
Y PBpΣq
#ż
u pW0 ´ Π´X ` Y q dP
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ 0 ď Y ď X,
ż
Y dQ˚ ď R
+
.
If R ě
ş
XdQ˚, then it is easy to verify that X is optimal for Problem (K.1).
Now, suppose that R ă
ş
XdQ˚. By the Radon-Nikody´m Theorem [13, Th. 4.2.2], for
each Q P C there exists a P -a.s. unique Σ-measurable and P -integrable function hQ : S Ñ
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r0,`8q such that Q pBq “
ş
B
hQdP , for all B P Σ. The function hQ is called the Radon-
Nikody´m derivative of Q with respect to P and it is denoted by dQ{dP . Moreover, since
Σ “ σtXu and since hQ : S Ñ r0,`8q is Σ-measurable and P -integrable, there exists a
Borel-measurable and P ˝X´1-integrable map φQ : X pSq Ñ r0,`8q such that hQ “ dQ{
dP “ φQ ˝X . Denoting dQ
˚{dP by φQ˚ ˝X , Problem (K.1) is equivalent to the following
problem:
(K.2) sup
Y PBpΣq
#ż
u pW0 ´ Π ´X ` Y q dP
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ 0 ď Y ď X,
ż
Y φQ˚ ˝XdP ď R
+
.
Let H :“
!
Y P B pΣq
ˇˇˇ
0 ď Y ď X and
ş
Y φQ˚ ˝XdP ď R
)
denote the feasibility set
of Problem (K.2).
Lemma K.1. For each Y P H, the function Y ˚ defined by Y ˚ :“ F´1Y pFX pXqq is such
that:
(1) Y ˚ P H;
(2) Y ˚ is comonotonic with X;
(3)
ş
u pW0 ´ Π´X ` Y
˚q dP ě
ş
u pW0 ´ Π ´X ` Y q dP ; and,
(4)
ş
Y ˚φQ˚ ˝XdP ď
ş
Y φQ˚ ˝XdP .
Proof. The proofs of (1), (2), and (3) are similar to what was done in the proof of Lemma
F.1. The proof of (4) is an immediate consequence of the fact that Q˚ is compatible with
P . 
Hence, by Lemma K.1, one can look for a solution to Problem (K.2) of the form F´1 pUq,
where F is the cdf of a function Z P B` pΣq such that 0 ď Z ď X and
ş
ZφQ˚ ˝ XdP ,
U “ FX pXq is a a random variable on the probability space pS,Σ, P q with a uniform
distribution on p0, 1q (Lemma F.1).
Recall the definition of the sets of quantiles Q and Q˚ given in equations (F.2)-(F.3),
and recall from Lemma F.1 that X “ F´1X pUq , P -a.s. Consider the following problem.
(K.3) sup
fPQ˚
#ż
u
`
W0 ´ Π´ F
´1
X pUq ` f pUq
˘
dP
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
ż
f pUqφQ˚ ˝ F
´1
X pUq dP ď R
+
.
Proposition K.2 (Quantile Characterization). If f˚ is optimal for Problem (K.3),
then the function f˚ pUq is optimal for Problem (K.2).
The proof of Proposition K.2 is similar to that of Proposition F.3. Proposition K.2 allows
us to focus on solving Problem (K.3), which we now address.
Lemma K.3. If f˚ P Q˚ satisfies the following:
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(1)
ş
1
0
f ptqφQ˚ ˝ F
´1
X ptq dt “ R,
(2) There exists λ ě 0 such that for all t P p0, 1q,
f˚ ptq “ argmax
0ďyďF´1
X
ptq
«
u
´
W0 ´ Π` y ´ F
´1
X ptq
¯
´ λφQ˚ ˝ F
´1
X ptq y
ﬀ
,
then f˚ solves Problem (K.3), and therefore, the function f˚ pUq is optimal for Problem
(K.2), where U “ FX pXq.
The proof of Proposition K.3 is similar to that of Proposition F.4. Lemma K.3 suggests
that in order to find a solution for Problem (K.3), one can start by solving the problem
(K.4) max
0ďfλptqďF
´1
X
ptq
”
u
´
W0 ´ Π` fλ ptq ´ F
´1
X ptq
¯
´ λφQ˚ ˝ F
´1
X ptq fλ ptq
ı
,
for a given λ ě 0 and for a fixed t P p0, 1q.
Lemma K.4. Let U “ FX pXq. An optimal solution for Problem (K.2) takes the form:
(K.5) Y˚ “ max
«
0,min
!
F´1X pUq , pu
1q
´1 `
λ˚φQ˚ ˝ F
´1
X pUq
˘
` F´1X pUq ´W0 ` Π
)ﬀ
,
where λ˚ is chosen so that
ş
φQ˚ ˝ F
´1
X pUqY
˚ dP “ R.
Proof. For a given λ ě 0 and for a fixed t P p0, 1q consider the problem:
(K.6) max
fλptq
”
u
´
W0 ´ Π` fλ ptq ´ F
´1
X ptq
¯
´ λφQ˚ ˝ F
´1
X ptq fλ ptq
ı
.
By Assumption 4.1, the first-order conditions are sufficient for an optimum for Problem
(K.6) and they imply that the function
f˚λ ptq :“ pu
1q
´1 `
λφQ˚ ˝ F
´1
X ptq
˘
` F´1X ptq ´W0 ` Π
solves Problem (K.6). The fact that u is concave and φQ˚ is nonincreasing imply that the
function f˚λ : p0, 1q Ñ R is nondecreasing, since F
´1
X is a nondecreasing function. Since
φQ˚ and pu
1q´1 are continuous, f˚λ is left-continuous. Consequently, f
˚
λ P Q, the set of all
quantile functions.
Now, define the function f˚˚λ by
(K.7) f˚˚λ ptq :“ max
«
0,min
!
F´1X ptq , f
˚
λ ptq
)ﬀ
.
It is then easy to check that f˚˚λ P Q, since f
˚
λ P Q and since F
´1
X is a nondecreasing
function. Moreover, 0 ď f˚˚λ pzq ď F
´1
X pzq, for each z P p0, 1q. Therefore, f
˚˚
λ P Q
˚.
Finally, it is easily seen that f˚˚λ ptq solves Problem (F.5) for the given λ and t, since the
concavity of u yields the concavity of the function z ÞÑ u
´
W0´Π` z´F
´1
X ptq
¯
´ λφQ˚ ˝
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F´1X ptq z, for each t P p0, 1q. Hence, in view of Lemma K.3, it remains to show that there
exists a λ˚ ě 0 such that
ş
1
0
φQ˚ ˝ F
´1
X ptq f
˚˚
λ˚ ptq dt “ R.
Let ψ be the function of the parameter λ ě 0 defined by
ψ pλq :“
ż
1
0
φQ˚˝F
´1
X ptqmax
«
0,min
!
F´1X ptq , pu
1q
´1 `
λφQ˚ ˝ F
´1
X ptq
˘
`F´1X ptq´W0`Π
)ﬀ
dt.
It then suffices to show that there exists a λ˚ ě 0 such that ψ pλ˚q “ R. Since X is
bounded and since F´1X is nondecreasing, it follows that for each t P r0, 1s,
min
!
F´1X ptq , pu
1q
´1 `
λφQ˚ ˝ F
´1
X ptq
˘
`F´1X ptq´W0`Π
)
ď F´1X ptq ď F
´1
X p1q ď }X}sup ă `8.
Moreover, since φQ˚ is nonincreasing and nonnegative, we have for each t P r0, 1s, 0 ď
φQ˚ ˝ F
´1
X ptq ď φQ˚
`
F´1X p0q
˘
. But since the function φQ˚ is continuous, it is bounded on
every closed and bounded subset of R. Therefore, φQ˚
`
F´1X p0q
˘
ă `8. Hence, for each
t P r0, 1s,
min
!
F´1X ptq , pu
1q
´1 `
λφQ˚ ˝ F
´1
X ptq
˘
` F´1X ptq ´W0 ` Π
)
φQ˚ ˝ F
´1
X ptq
ď F´1X p1qφQ˚
`
F´1X p0q
˘
ă `8.
Hence, Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence Theorem [2, Theorem 11.21] implies that ψ is
a continuous function of λ. Moreover, ψ is a nonincreasing function of λ (by concavity of
u and by monotonicity of the Lebesgue integral).
Now, Assumption 4.1 implies that
ψ p0q “
ż
1
0
φQ˚ ˝ F
´1
X ptqF
´1
X ptq dt “
ż
F´1X pUq φQ˚
`
F´1X pUq
˘
dP
“
ż
XφQ˚ pXq dP “
ż
X dQ˚,
and that
lim
λÑ`8
ψ pλq “
ż
1
0
φQ˚ ˝ F
´1
X ptqmax
«
0,min
!
F´1X ptq , F
´1
X ptq ´W0 ` Π
)ﬀ
dt
“
ż
1
0
φQ˚ ˝ F
´1
X ptqmax
«
0, F´1X ptq ´W0 ` Π
ﬀ
dt “ 0,
where the last equality follows from the fact that FX pW0 ´ Πq “ 1 (Assumption 5.3), and
hence F´1X ptq ď W0 ´ Π, for all t P p0, 1q. Consequently,
0 “ lim
λÑ`8
ψ pλq ď R ă
ż
X dQ˚ “ ψ p0q .
Hence, by the Intermediate Value Theorem [38, Theorem 4.23], there exists a λ˚ ě 0 such
that ψ pλ˚q “ R. This concludes the proof of Lemma K.4. 
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Now, since X “ F´1X pUq , P -a.s.,
max
«
0,min
!
F´1X pUq , pu
1q
´1 `
λ˚φQ˚ ˝ F
´1
X pUq
˘
` F´1X pUq ´W0 ` Π
)ﬀ
“ max
«
0,min
!
X, pu1q
´1
pλ˚φQ˚ ˝Xq `X ´W0 ` Π
)ﬀ
, P -a.s.
Therefore, letting Y˚
2
“ max
«
0,min
!
X, pu1q´1 pλ˚φQ˚ ˝Xq ` X ´W0 ` Π
)ﬀ
, it follows
that ż
φQ˚ ˝XY
˚
2
dP “
ż
Y˚φQ˚ ˝X dP “
ż
Y˚ dQ˚ “ R,
and that ż
u pW0 ´ Π´X ` Y
˚
2
q dP “
ż
u pW0 ´ Π ´X ` Y
˚q dP.
In other words, Y˚
2
is also optimal for Problem (5.3). Define Y ˚ by
Y ˚ “ min
«
X,max
´
0, X ´ d pφQ˚q
¯ﬀ
, where d pφQ˚q “ W0 ´ Π´ pu
1q
´1
´
λ˚φQ˚ ˝X
¯
.
It can then easily be verified that Y ˚ “ Y˚
2
. l
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